Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3fb0a9d65144823…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.0 KB Created: 2021-07-19 10:29:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 1b60524c30295729072dea4ffbd37436 SHA-1: a9dc14ae74923c5f2909210125f8d28c16e21366 SHA-256: c3fb0a9d6514482371a5c9c1babbc07b9870cd66864d5f5d7ded099ab85cb745
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes the Shell() function to launch PowerShell, which is then instructed to execute a Base64 encoded string. This string likely decodes to a malicious payload, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality. The presence of the Document_Open macro and the use of Shell() to execute PowerShell are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d3e9c83256f3a4703b039a5f0b4c0741ab723e5e1c7d27643235b369755a5640
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2140 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
dcb77b81303e45a46dc9e9ac7b5adab7e04323275bb20b7b88fa9b2a02b3f1c4
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12288 bytes