Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3f665331135853e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

105.7 KB Created: 2021-07-26 05:40:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 639d38fabe6e66962e425b29ade770c5 SHA-1: ecc5e539d4b15ba4f8d4eec0687bd5a4ab1a6ca4 SHA-256: c3f665331135853e627c3eeb6eecaf87b815b549fb1c099501c30bbb95001e90
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro that is heavily obfuscated. The macro uses CreateObject and CallByName to execute code, and it attempts to download a payload from a remote URL. The document body impersonates an Amazon order confirmation to trick the user into opening the malicious document.

Heuristics 8

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACON
    Document references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: https://divine-bar-3d75.visual-candy.workers.dev/colorful.png
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://divine-bar-3d75.visual-candy.workers.dev/colorful.png

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8de7b4c596c67fc7840e68f3fbba0a4c531f21e2ab21817f285a53cd064c6d81		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 117381 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
7bb6f24103195fb40fe2c759de960cb2675588db5e21fba07102e4aa92e41c5e		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 115200 bytes

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