Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3e4e640b73e7841…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.4 KB Created: 2021-08-21 19:05:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: c50c1e682861d171395069bd643065eb SHA-1: 579adabb0d6cd596d5dc6de1565662a8629240b7 SHA-256: c3e4e640b73e7841dda0c9af6c131e2169ab78ac270874c39f3b1801e60b0894
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF exhibits multiple high-severity heuristics indicating malicious intent, including malformed streams and links to algorithmically generated URLs hosted on compromised CMS uploads. The 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic strongly suggests the document's purpose is to trick the user into decrypting and opening a malicious archive. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF with high confidence. While no scripts were directly extracted, the overall structure and heuristics point to a phishing or malware delivery attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://erinmillssmilesdentistry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/csse745ai632el3m5e0tp0mkk0/dirasatoxofegebomuda.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://banglatalkies.com/dynamic-images/cms/file/14168005347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a25cab6dd03---mapukuta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rkmaster.ru/uploads/files/3292993251.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bellamy.tw/uploads/files/202108210621234899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.gsccn.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ed922e2800b---zumafusiwegusiguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://unityproductions.com/upload/files/9319503996.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baatco.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kapaparikixenuku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hi-reid-solutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/89c00345b0dc30ee29ff1af3f0598a60/kedenenusopi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hoanghaie.com/Images_upload/files/ritesunufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ideatity.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/64825874258.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seamcc.com/UserFiles/files/tezubanotafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resonanceacteurs.nl/userfiles/file/zuxuwaxokunejosaxekot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fleschimmo.lu/userfiles/files/45708056565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://developmentassociationofnagaland.org/nbloom/fckuploads/file/92993521748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bargiel.com.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pupizire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bestcoloringpages.com/userfiles/file/rilara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://apsara.ru/userfiles/file/xizadinise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://taskentcompany.com/userfiles/file/71918398581.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mnd8qq8v6edkuj9nsv9r6002u1/79648794104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shinaltd.ru/images/file/22403387552.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://didongsinhvien.com/upload/files/8653214228.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.luminicaambiental.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070bef5281b2---zagagogelekevixukipedez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nffcd.org/userfiles/files/fanukewaneduga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=god+of+war+chains+of+olympus+ppsspp+cheat+db+downloadPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e24a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE24A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fa61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA61 11364 bytes
SHA-256: 61307c8b0b396fc16c87c962a295cebc88f35876123b14342b26abc6952869f7
font_02_sfnt_off000114d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x114D4 17356 bytes
SHA-256: d615fc9e614dcb8ec9c2406230971d4f4256717df084c22f87ce9d57c60ae0ec

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