Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3c915c358975133…

MALICIOUS

RTF

19.2 KB First seen: 2018-09-04
MD5: 9833e9028d19228e319f0c9d12d3c6ee SHA-1: 25996a346bb31dfd79b035ca5dca8c068a01e26f SHA-256: c3c915c358975133799ae8f7d007233cc2c8642a6d8dfe9e42c3302772e16bbb
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CLSID identified by RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".objupdate" directive forces activation of this object, which is likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of the OLE object data and the specific heuristics strongly indicate exploitation for client execution, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001675.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1675 4645 bytes
SHA-256: 969501c1ab9d74e743dee9d3d72fc5398b7b2ccdd0919b6e6796888e24e2a67f