Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3bd336dc25affdc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

228.6 KB Created: 2017-06-07 10:46:28 +03:00 Authoring application: iTextSharp’ 5.5.10 ©2000-2016 iText Group NV (AGPL-version)
MD5: ce96e7bdea24e16c1c859cd6d5156ff2 SHA-1: d1e59247762e84e6005e4ca60e703f68cd2318e9 SHA-256: c3bd336dc25affdc669f1c220a3572e446fb8274a0cea389fc8802a1180de52b
348 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

The sample is a PDF document that leverages CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Office, to download and execute a secondary payload. The embedded JavaScript and OLE object data, along with the critical heuristic firings for CVE-2017-0199 and OLE auto-linking, strongly indicate a malicious dropper. The primary IOC is the URL used to fetch the next stage of the attack.

Heuristics 13

  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7127408-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7127408-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0001.bin
cc59a615b00e9cb056ad33f908bee6887a07009ec235853f9260dcdaf913a3bf
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1 at offset 0x83 5758 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7127408-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 17 long base64-like blob(s).
javascript_obj0014_000.js
4c0efe1f857861f5b71004078c353e10c2b95d2d870bdb93eec9cf2d973b948f
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 14 at offset 0x38EAE 52 bytes
javascript_obj0003_001.js
c4c6d99b6a49c4d550266b164d59617ee8e67114f1d0ddc6ef6da1159813fd94
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 3 at offset 0x23B0 108 bytes
objdata_00_off0000022e.bin
eeb20da5c057f3ac513e1242cc5467b14808694b5a168828f19f96c5490dd6c2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x22E 2601 bytes