Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · c3b617e0c6b8f01c

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

43.5 KB Created: 2025-06-23 06:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-02-16

MD5: c83ce20c9e000654dc66234772380a95 SHA-1: bcf2e5228263049910ca3d14dc55727a96c2ad51 SHA-256: c3b617e0c6b8f01cf628a2b3db40e8d06ef20a3c71365ccc1799787119246010

370 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate

The sample is a malicious Office document that uses VBA macros to execute. The AutoOpen macro displays a fake error message to the user, prompting them to enable macros or take other actions. It then constructs and writes a VBScript payload to disk at 'C:\Users\<user>\4e81a907-cc30-45c0-8bbd-5248e9f6dacd.vbs' and a batch file at 'C:\Users\<user>\4e81a907-cc30-45c0-8bbd-5248e9f6dacd.bat'. The VBScript payload is designed to execute commands, and the batch file contains commands to delete temporary files. The document also contains an embedded URL used as a web beacon, likely for tracking document opens.

Heuristics 12

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL

VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACON

Document references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL

External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: http://webhook.site/d63049e3-1cbe-474b-9005-237517af53a7/docopened.jpg
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://webhook.site/d63049e3-1cbe-474b-9005-237517af53a7/docopened.jpg
- https://webhook.site/5dbed3be-f1c9-41e5-b5d5-e961d08b5fba
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task^

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `e12160092339a276768fef990df3c9a7ab90ebfe311980b01aaf5247a1a2bcac`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	8867 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
`vbaProject_00.bin` `c4ca54ef3c92292cb30547cc8866c9e8b48db80ca4bd2107eb2317c249417909`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	44032 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.