Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c38f5e2a7ba1b98b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 8fcd570caeb1a2aa09c599a85fc2c7e7 SHA-1: e63e4cb354159be3600bcabf1e9835851276059a SHA-256: c38f5e2a7ba1b98bf316cc10cae78b2077ab9bb5e4396853bbfa8cfd80708186
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000aa.bin
8b44a20bb8e3591d14a24002a8031d9dbb2aae4892fd657b84151247fe185f80
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAA 1917 bytes