Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c38df4431b564129…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.4 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: c4ae353e478dacd2cfd285df858f216b SHA-1: 3b332586b76af70c28972f34f96748dfb85cdfbd SHA-256: c38df4431b5641294e74e65f44a93b127ac8e233fa13a792d6189a524dc1fe46
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2010-0188 indicates exploitation of Adobe Reader's XFA image handling. This suggests the PDF is designed to deliver a payload via this vulnerability. No JavaScript or VBA scripts were extracted, and the document body is not human-readable, making it difficult to determine the exact second-stage action. However, the presence of an embedded file further supports the payload delivery hypothesis.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
9842b657fc2caf4f71f6510490b93acaa6daaf4aa9879c676a9ab3c2031f05e5
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes