Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3838722e07ee10e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

101.9 KB Created: 2021-07-31 22:06:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: e537f9fb524f8bca361ff0b64562c5c1 SHA-1: 6249fe205da5c518ccdec7ce5355218cc356e0e6 SHA-256: c3838722e07ee10e0032b5fe99d0e2143a884ff2feadff276a0ea61604ef12a0
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics reveal it functions as a link farm, directing users to multiple external websites, some hosted on compromised CMS platforms. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to redirect users to potentially malicious content, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://attlas.center/userfiles/file/vimafafita.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://pulsarvn.com/media/ftp/file/84572054271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://truck-diagnostic.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/87848d1f1e4da2a0235f474200caf862/siwomefalazomipurez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://timatey.kz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hf60omhtgagk1v6nhilestgnh7/66852963706.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://malopolskiszlakwinny.pl/upload/File/zubekusidore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lbs.ac.at/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0misbsd8scgl96o3b1ib3aj8p3/lebozaxovuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sportli.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b9a1988214d---wupuwijipexikajumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://auto826.com/uploads/files/moxuwetibolefejimeravodan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://drahmetbostanci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609867815bc0f---sanekusozonozuguguvar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aldea.work/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9779d5c9c86077fb916a7df7b4c006e3/49211689581.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.clubmanizales.com.co/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cf7ab3dd058---mokomavakapokib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eyestech.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kilugmmoo1ek3ssc90nlnop8r3/vesomelanuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://controlcert.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8a8406e8c7---tosijikikopogom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kripasec.com/userfiles/file/ruder.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://animationcoach.com/userfiles/file/80171452436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://militarynetwork.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cf072ecd237---tawusovikabilu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dnepropress.net/files/file/47677967162.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.citysecurity.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pdh7qg2gom962512lggpcu7jt7/viropusolarugejeboge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.elektrobetrieb-scholz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ca4a593b15---31261974735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a539ef606a0---gugatesadasinuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fceresources.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/damitek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cffcommunications.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/16086610ac8754---14347330009.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dade666.com/userfiles/202107file/2021073001270270554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hkt-optics.com/hkt/images/userfiles/file/jujodusepuporivelusiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tepihtrava.rs//files/xilinitodisamuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/cv9VXjIrmdE/uplcv?utm_term=how+much+does+an+operations+manager+make+at+targetPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00012962.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12962 11184 bytes
SHA-256: 87dc9b5e0eb592b24005c9b2776a303d1ede6d2115db515d3cdda4fe8c98115c
font_01_sfnt_off00014338.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14338 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00015b4a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15B4A 17376 bytes
SHA-256: 41a9f993b48b0f28d507a0084c9c7a33c8cb2d516d0e873a76ff6029392c447d

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