Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c378b6ed15a836cc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.2 KB Created: 2020-07-31 04:27:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: eea253a86c086e1bc88e30bbf22a8a6b SHA-1: 34c5afb00ccafc9ed8b46a4ce513e9f5a792bdfe SHA-256: c378b6ed15a836cc1d621d95e33e731b3d7d9562f9b15fcb86419c380158f211
210 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a link to a known malicious redirector and a large number of SEO-optimized links to other PDFs. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, combined with the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristics, strongly suggests a social engineering attack. The user is instructed to copy and paste content, likely to execute a command that would download and run a second-stage payload. The primary malicious URL identified is ttraff.cc.

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=pen+drive+bootable+command+for+windows+7+pdf
    • http://files.cometsbaton.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681164/xifuvonaretamodegaja.pdf
    • http://files.ashleymartinportfolio.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712093/tejesarot_jubewifagokajax.pdf
    • http://files.calgarybmx.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407080/sowogelelawa.pdf
    • http://files.shirazgermanshepherds.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070529/696497.pdf
    • http://files.poconohydrofarm.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969435/91eaeb76609.pdf
    • http://files.calgarybmx.com/uploa
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tedogunugovosilogupex.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5305/5128/files/lakulozib.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0802/4985/files/xafutek.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4277/3914/files/42029463235.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2717/6344/files/9396501210.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2012/3285/files/siluzovogetefixiti.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6108/4322/files/92491350002.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9575/2864/files/58376968029.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5131/0488/files/xarudomudukofovusafesosub.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8320/2711/files/wuzeselakufapigaxunujofib.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000077d9.bin
d4af5ae87aba37fb81404be5127066369742ffd08ee1f127ec566fd6693cfa12		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x77D9 5460 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008a64.bin
6fca7e57eb7e1c4df0c5f969d6774c7bbfea7ef6b9ada6953a191e8cb1432d11		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8A64 9952 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000acb0.bin
4636c7523e8c0c4659ec89c752f488d70eb2ea504770eb3e0be851c502e4ce70		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xACB0 16488 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.