Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c37673f75b4d6c48…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

313.9 KB
MD5: df98a1e3333ee8477467f71d76e5448c SHA-1: ec3165cea7d209cc0968daa060b6790939dce2a9 SHA-256: c37673f75b4d6c4830725ca3d66d396d83cb0802b2cd56a6b5f7708cab1bfaf2
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted Office XLSX file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and specifically flags CVE-2018-0798, suggesting it's designed to exploit this vulnerability. The document is also flagged as an exploit carrier and contains CFB FAT corruption, further supporting its malicious nature. No document body or scripts were extractable due to encryption, but the presence of the exploit carrier and the specific CVE points to a delivery mechanism for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.