Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c371f385124eb20b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

211.9 KB
MD5: dcd2e0453a22374eb5c5f1f0cdb4d593 SHA-1: 235cd4723a6ffbd0bcc606b70b4a98125979dc76 SHA-256: c371f385124eb20b1921419c44035df5dc87055365b49b5ed5bd0d7f1e7f3fad
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and uses ".objupdate" to force activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded content. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a typical social engineering lure to bypass macro security. No scripts were extracted, and the embedded OLE objects could not be further analyzed for specific payloads.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000989.bin
714e26cbc000f73eeeec243565716a7e4ca1169d86adb61d8b51eb442abec4b3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x989 12583 bytes
objdata_01_off00006c48.bin
efcad781cab3d633c5a53c0b86b2c30761dd037463d8eb36ded19f59f1126d89
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x6C48 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000081e3.bin
cfdf79b95584afe599f8bd01e391d8904839d9495e407a353433d3f5e3be3602
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x81E3 12261 bytes