Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c36ff5d9e3b73af1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.1 KB First seen: 2022-11-11
MD5: 5e8efbd50a7c62fa0c92e1c8ac1e2913 SHA-1: fabed86ff61ecda9a961bd3cc697ef0abf187e21 SHA-256: c36ff5d9e3b73af141c6861ad064a833b5af81ddf4b21c936ea7ab71f70bf773
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, which is a known exploit vector. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', indicating an attempt to bypass macro security settings and execute the embedded malicious object. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000528f.bin
185f6b3c43be68bfd2fac3e1eb8918cb49e6ce97519679e2eb568ebe262a35a2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x528F 1869 bytes