Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c366eec516fea294…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.7 KB
MD5: e8975cb1ef276df8e419a8a3e94df33b SHA-1: ef7b82e6c4ab6a67679f8ace1245cd0bf3a47dd4 SHA-256: c366eec516fea294cadfaae444c8e1e403e872c64f513bb2f9c8ef4cf93688d5
106 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains an embedded XFA form that triggers the CVE-2010-0188 exploit. This exploit is known to allow arbitrary code execution when a vulnerable version of Adobe Reader processes the malicious PDF. The embedded URL is likely part of the exploit chain or a lure.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xE8A 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xF3C 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0111.bin
7284a2e8fd33daad41ecf4a656eec5edf36c4a875c78c68c1e52afa1355d20cd		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 111 at offset 0x1156 61430 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x213D 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x21EA 77 bytes

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