Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c35af9a6d71d7270…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.2 KB Created: 2020-08-17 08:58:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5a78732b8c52f81ca5be1b1fead35e33 SHA-1: 5c62bcdd682621bb618daa64b35a403bc3b5ecaa SHA-256: c35af9a6d71d7270bab68a07f2be7cebcc1e0030f78bcc3dc7e2dd0cfbc9d809
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to Shopify domains hosting other PDFs, suggesting a link farm for SEO manipulation. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector, https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=afterpay+touch+group+annual+report+2018, which is likely used to obscure the final malicious destination. The document body, though partially corrupted, contains text related to 'Afterpay touch group annual report 2018', indicating a lure to disguise the malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=afterpay+touch+group+annual+report+2018
    • http://files.pd-parenting.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969999/bexulogewilelasetiza.pdf
    • http://files.frankpaino.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740256/zopola.pdf
    • http://nirepoze.openbookaustralia.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969264/bofozudebi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7926/1590/files/31781433052.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7103/6823/files/59194416535.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3837/5074/files/ghatna_chakra_gs_in_english_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/2610/1910/files/nuzezinikogenew.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3398/4162/files/quantitative_risk_analysis_in_project_management.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9726/7101/files/lamirelepiwozuximuzi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8457/0019/files/biomedical_waste_management_in_hospitals.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2937/2821/files/jamujaruberumafunop.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0433/6027/files/alcatel_lucent_4019_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5698/8317/files/technical_report_on_building_construction.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005934.bin
6954050033ddff367f1f0a120190c4d4d9c4eb69ceb37b4fb3bf74a5c7610985		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5934 5708 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006cb1.bin
73771ce562ebb067a18182ac7fa4c2f2c855e7fdb78304e61d736f82f555f1fc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6CB1 10424 bytes

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