Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c342b8f658295985…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

393.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-08
MD5: 8ba4265925fcd2ef802ee6724b97f054 SHA-1: 70b08e7ca534301db5bcbf1a771fec6cd3c957a6 SHA-256: c342b8f658295985b2a3417fe75b44ee1e9a576d3ff0a7b3fa1213cb2a5f632a
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates that the file contains a payload exploiting this specific vulnerability within the Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of VBA macros, though not executable, suggests a potential for further malicious activity. The file's primary function appears to be the exploitation of this known Office vulnerability to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
a6990910045149550de20579a751e1d5107f5fd4d94164d20758f0e5bfed0cf7
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0157ABD0/Ole10NatIVe 1618 bytes