Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3285584b4afe60a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

651.4 KB Created: 2003-07-07 18:34:32 UTC Authoring application: OmniForm (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0.5 (Windows))
MD5: 79c120402112869d62bc18ed0add6fcb SHA-1: 71cac1ec346744744e9a675f0f0e48b0cee1297a SHA-256: c3285584b4afe60a8ec7f4201ae2c65d732e9dea929da9c20b56d6ed3846c418
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file contains numerous JavaScript streams and triggers JavaScript actions, including the use of eval() and String.fromCharCode. The high number of streams suggests obfuscation or a heap spray. While no specific malicious URLs or scripts were directly extracted and reconstructed, the heavy reliance on JavaScript execution within the PDF indicates a malicious intent, likely to download and execute a secondary payload or exploit a vulnerability.

Heuristics 8

  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Unusually high stream count medium PDF_MANY_STREAMS
    PDF contains 501+ stream objects — may indicate heap spray or heavy obfuscation
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.h\
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/t/pg/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 32

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ClientEnvironment
beb3462d625d0908f9f83f9eb33269867ac9843b5139ac5d3cda3ffcbda539d9
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1025 at offset 0x609E5 1002 bytes
javascript_obj1252_000.js
3a1171d5c29a38e4d6ee9145e1a28845c833c1d0195915aee008bea71b971a75
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1252 at offset 0x28968 34 bytes
javascript_obj1253_001.js
ad3beb36c9be904cb528af802aca057ca0f97e99bd6c0401cf86f05dc45ba258
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1253 at offset 0x289BE 54 bytes
javascript_obj1254_002.js
011b69045b66b6966dda07e6574c3e601347369aec52dfa520c28ea3c80c4546
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1254 at offset 0x28A2A 48 bytes
javascript_obj1255_003.js
3aafe97981aa219647c6afeeefc2f4f22721d2604cdc1ec43aa4ab12754926d5
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1255 at offset 0x28A94 51 bytes
javascript_obj1257_005.js
acb2b89f84755059d88c59f29ba927217c66aa24b0b7e082f0d4ea869f5f4206
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1257 at offset 0x28B51 53 bytes
javascript_obj1263_006.js
43568d8dc529b9fe39029fa296993215eaf60156ef86b8186cbc2d2ee24d2b76
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1263 at offset 0x28CDA 68 bytes
javascript_obj1264_007.js
948d246143266b551322fee0ce6809f6228f1d2c6e954998905235689e805af8
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1264 at offset 0x28D54 52 bytes
javascript_obj1269_008.js
0eb1aad3aee3cb327cae7671ec2675aacfc7f1150c775919aa03e6a08a3925c9
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1269 at offset 0x28E84 52 bytes
javascript_obj1270_009.js
b1a9fb15b55bae252ec2934fefa0390bb1221220f729b18c6c57ed7de71ebebf
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1270 at offset 0x28EEE 38 bytes
javascript_obj1271_010.js
75ba8fe718bf1aa28c28b0badf17592b43c66f649b97d55fb1ad820ef5cb16eb
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1271 at offset 0x28F4A 43 bytes
javascript_obj1273_011.js
5bfd1fcd6dbbeb0427be95ca6f2538ef873a86bf11feb7a053a2e3f880b3a2b2
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1273 at offset 0x29008 47 bytes
javascript_obj1277_012.js
0fb0bc5871c4772aaf6ad76554d1f02b8542fccb3435e8b8bb2e5bd06ecfdbc1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1277 at offset 0x290BC 35 bytes
javascript_obj1286_015.js
15db25e9f31cc1db67b813a9f5752a0b3a0990aeb733dcd3a675650ae36e7194
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1286 at offset 0x2A306 53 bytes
javascript_obj1287_016.js
37cba162c45cc497ccfabffa10e19a4594277f8f45f4eb07164d1b740dc8aa6c
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1287 at offset 0x2A36D 37 bytes
javascript_obj1290_018.js
b49875e7a786cc7d62191be88c49afc7a7f53551d4ec30ddf24c3fd7583d7233
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1290 at offset 0x2A43B 33 bytes
javascript_obj1292_020.js
4eb7d5ace7194418d2ca5bc75cbf1493c6d7310a7cf2edd0215d7a8ba209df69
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1292 at offset 0x2A4CC 47 bytes
javascript_obj1294_021.js
d142b227ef353e292510aacdf9509469e367287182a0ee3ddd10130546ef3d45
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1294 at offset 0x2A57F 46 bytes
javascript_obj1298_022.js
9e58df098f822aaa721ed10dcebdad81bb5a1237f57b3d2ab894dd7e22b381a4
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1298 at offset 0x2A6BA 59 bytes
javascript_obj1300_023.js
97d4961192fe0adef35677e51ca072bd70429e8e9aa55d02744c0e4262f499a0
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1300 at offset 0x2A784 48 bytes
javascript_obj1303_024.js
7e0807da407b7681e052a2ac612ae17b162df02b71e1249809ec4de5528d4c5d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1303 at offset 0x2A84D 56 bytes
javascript_obj1305_025.js
5ac9b01a6870ec29a1cb91df721807e91e62e17e2594874d6da94017a9617dbb
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1305 at offset 0x2A90D 59 bytes
javascript_obj1307_026.js
33595198d6819a3bb1f9ade0cb3d0dc864c58c1b2c871a4c8d127892e43e8818
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1307 at offset 0x2A9D4 57 bytes
javascript_obj1312_027.js
2a7f7eeccd6e0f1c2d5f3853c2712947e6f02f5365310ce3ad4347bf7190ff92
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1312 at offset 0x2AB3E 66 bytes
javascript_obj1314_028.js
1d2a6e349c743912089cadfd9cc026a38f06c3a717feb835d65838ad2024a65a
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1314 at offset 0x2AC10 63 bytes
javascript_obj1316_029.js
8af14d4bcfa43789b7492523c723805c1d28215dfe83b471654347713c052335
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1316 at offset 0x2ACDD 59 bytes
javascript_obj1318_030.js
53db24e58427768002f53fd3a8c4e1b5c55c35a7dc544d0cdf3eba1e5178e0b6
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1318 at offset 0x2ADA0 65 bytes
javascript_obj1319_031.js
c2e6b56da9eaf64b4435e817c688a39e837635e65c9550b1880bffcd36a8defd
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1319 at offset 0x2AE11 162 bytes
javascript_obj1321_032.js
4e619262277086c0fa9493f20043e236b838ec4cf933981a9ea5cc0d4c01d0c5
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1321 at offset 0x2B00C 106 bytes
javascript_obj1322_033.js
46d680a99e51f3a29f99b4cffd2121bbab1719982aca54bc6d3f86624d30ba52
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1322 at offset 0x2B0AE 49 bytes
javascript_obj1328_037.js
2c44f622282dffd17742bb5ef78a8f001f345a30097360af9ecc1db2c4439043
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1328 at offset 0x2B27D 54 bytes
javascript_obj1332_038.js
64379f2bd499310a0fd1ea3856e8a6f73b84c55906772e65555aaed5e9f77a38
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1332 at offset 0x2B3C8 53 bytes