Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c3197d850fa54a79…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.5 KB Created: 2021-04-02 03:15:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-13
MD5: 066bbca4a737c0d4a15c14102b83a5ce SHA-1: 05ca2b71351b6a96beb4f97b51a9cfdd503f32c4 SHA-256: c3197d850fa54a790399cf5c896bed6c42f71a37d7ca4f16aca0ab08f499c2da
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF that uses a lure of 'aptitude questions for gate pdf' to trick the user. It contains numerous external URIs pointing to disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious content. The 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass gateway scanning. ClamAV detection and ML classification confirm its malicious nature, likely as a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mezovuduw.ru/award?keyword=aptitude+questions+for+gate+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://keto-s1.com/wemovozugike1sr1s.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4461201/normal_5ffef0752cb2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartline58.ru/usmc_corporals_course_test_answersm8cep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kraftmann.su/20327370331gjk1q.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fumozowafujazuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135331302/7278711.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://opticsystem.website/60127551155uuxwc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ig-verifiedsbadge.com/69149381837lmjw3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454546/normal_5fd2c7159d00f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mifevulesitiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321383/dc9e11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutegejedexugak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135384922/6e1a4b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411229/normal_606649342d4b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gufutaca1.xyz/arris_cm820_modem_default_passwordq5b2t.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zikizitepef.iblogger.org/11140930365.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uplrezina.site/how_much_do_natives_get_a_monthbcrvv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://foyou.store/931024205428jwj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wopari/molupesunarabojilufitevev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://doxajapew.rf.gd/um_admiravel_mundo_novo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dutuzanob/nofusomaralole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fd50.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD50 5292 bytes
SHA-256: 3ff88e3e4a9aef824aff6ac5e2eaf1f13f2d045d6893bccfb12869b6e6a6ec59
font_01_sfnt_off00010f5d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F5D 10928 bytes
SHA-256: 1d8e9ad71afa2070d2df0251a67f7f2652b989fbaee51dced2c35cacf515497a

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