Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c303e77553b75f0b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: 8cb9b77318c92e9289633e9dd2421ed3 SHA-1: 27d426bb5de603731e8ab55fc8d738a58989554c SHA-256: c303e77553b75f0b85e040d03aad3a7c706fb64162be66f2c23c16f0edae5e7f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ".objupdate" and the decoded object data strongly indicate that the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for arbitrary code execution upon opening. No scripts or URLs were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
b55fb578a24d4d23789e60dd222b3650122d8f31181cb19ef1826bc6b44c8ff0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27722 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d2a1.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2A1 478713 bytes