Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c2e434ccc742697a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.1 KB Created: 2021-09-16 08:09:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: 6be5ce0d6d9dac0e9818bc63d4c03737 SHA-1: f9e0d428b6ba96f327d2382697b08c955b00941b SHA-256: c2e434ccc742697a233e67392ccdf6996eba8a1e0a1b99abf0f46b52ec96dbd2
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript and numerous links. Several heuristics indicate that these links point to other PDF files hosted on compromised WordPress sites or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9912

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pereplanirovkaoblast.ru/pict/file/favibaxefaponikuzi.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://hantechwelding.com/userfiles/file/2021091320573873499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eastmanllc.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zulurevapimugefonagiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inlandautorepairmurrietaca.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d3a94800fd5eb753c3f02bfd72fe6697/bamuwonojewezarudiligi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.anglometais.com.br/adm/Editor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/64297174769.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dermatologie-francophone.com/userfiles/file/nonutixilaxisoxuzigukeni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://caycanh.vn/images/fck/file/zexazefijutarezazujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alcoquimicos.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gamewi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liftsystems.ro/LiftFiles/file/20615804371.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136aab5c2c31---15852338213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lamuccacompany.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bb3b5f6209a129cd3a9797886140f3a1/27423210003.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jmyhship.com/uploadfile/files/sadogumorufegetidubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://visualpaint.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161355a8583be8---40228791640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://global-product.org/CKEdit/upload/files/wezow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dailitara.lt/bites/uploads/file/48963307641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://idroilektriki.gr/files/file/13866337665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sichera.eu/userfiles/files/48374455742.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kabelkyaobuv.sk/editor_uploads/files/temoxazuvonefezipigevob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wacee.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612f3c1e22980---73767419981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://utcsp.rustyramone.com/uploads/files/lasadurazinasodovakif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accu-split.com/userfiles/files/vuxaga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://halkapsikoloji.com/userfiles/file/kifako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://battlegrouponline.com/app/webroot/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/44661379890.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://to-tuong.com/media/ckfinder/files/puremofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://at1apigroup3.com/contents/files/difudeletujivewarop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://homeaestheticsllc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/79336c64870b210ce4fce5e9ce06a21b/wazevanatefevunokabu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=move+data+from+android+appPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e63a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE63A 10504 bytes
SHA-256: 56b4ccc740358879c19ad8b2dac0515d03a39656905631cca42af7aaf743544a
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe1a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE1A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off0001162c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1162C 17228 bytes
SHA-256: f0e8167cbbc147ee3a9a0e96e8e4d560a26f9b3d34e49b442115dea2b652c1c4

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