Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c2b2ff731c22babc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

51.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-16
MD5: f154612001f690d19cfde030d350371c SHA-1: 8d38eb6998394b7b5dd5c6193c913c5ccd226f6b SHA-256: c2b2ff731c22babcf3ff873836d43f4a6f858aa6d0e596b49a29c5583d595dc8
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted Office document that leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows the embedded OLE object to load a remote resource from the URL http://jmcglone.com@23.95.34.121/inv/https_o/www.doc, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document's encryption and exploit carrier structure are indicative of a malicious dropper.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@23.95.34.121/inv/https_o/www.doc

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