MALICIOUS
126
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the sample attempts to exploit this vulnerability by downloading a payload from the URL http://192.3.216.144/PPL/AWSSDSWEHJERDUFYDYUERJHFDFUHUSDF%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23FJDFJSDJF%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23DHFJHDFJSDFHJSDF.DOC. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious static findings, suggesting it may be used as a lure or to further obfuscate the malicious activity.
Heuristics 5
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OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://192.3.216.144/PPL/AWSSDSWEHJERDUFYDYUERJHFDFUHUSDF%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23FJDFJSDJF%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23DHFJHDFJSDFHJSDF.DOC
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001a00.pdfc449707bd992d0cdfefc75c2ca59d354873206b48a2eff098310400dadd9fdf0 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1A00 | 691200 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006e00.pdf6ca5d36d0d2671facc000ff6f7fac23c06a8a245066b6562bc95424f672fc2e0 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6E00 | 669696 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015a00.pdffa10009583703d4d9b44e1c82ac248454b793b79e280507c147fae387c4df0e2 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15A00 | 609280 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00025a00.pdfef2052a8a31c9506bcb29b5e3ed9d19e7d9cc3c6bd155bd9da9e7afd19b75081 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x25A00 | 543744 bytes |
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