Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c27e70a4052aee4e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.5 KB Created: 2021-09-19 18:25:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: 82f3ca0ca5c4c1d02678c3c514e3b89c SHA-1: ef498a2cb768f51e7f1113315aeaf3e19dfa82bd SHA-256: c27e70a4052aee4eabcc31526b41004e0feac92ac7c4fc4857e37e0c97568e86
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is often used to exploit vulnerabilities or redirect users. It also contains numerous links to compromised websites and a link farm, suggesting an attempt to host or distribute malicious content. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports a phishing or social engineering attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xageunion.com/userfiles/file/45257910990.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://virtuozi.ru/sites/all/sites/virtuozi.ru/files/9125730644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.funes.gob.ar/ckfinder/userfiles/files/puliza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vallejardin.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6ff3dcee64584a000107a02dd7b927e7/kuruponukemif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.keystonecare.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f9dc609fc77f3583c8fc846c79d68fe6/tebulipakowijinuxoli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://opuspointpartner.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/77194553253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://droneducational.com/admin/userfiles/file/gixofibetemuvidug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://svenjakretschmer.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/92281178452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chicagohalo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16131fe2ad5cec---pumerakag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://acrgruppe.de/userfiles/file/luvulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ddd-iasi.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613213673a6f4---20993812073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://opusbiz.kr/data/editor/file/1984956176613aba4d3e623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albertopizzetti.it/userfiles/files/zumerevodewawigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kd-council.com/upfile/files/69048975049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://krainaogrodow.eu/zdjecia/fck/file/73207324896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kme.pl/global/app/webroot/uploads/file/16316073165623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weborder.cloud/userfiles/file///96693486685.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwmountvernon.com/uploads/files/nokedafizavomami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sicilalluminio.it/userfiles/files/67339662346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alismobile.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b1f2e862ad4dab7a8b89be03013f3fa2/xasutesusufeluwujazoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://roomyab.ir/basefile/roomyabir/files/lopuva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://everbeenmagnet.com/js/upfiles/files/38033821600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhhieu.vn/hinhanh/file/muwidibosaxekubov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://s-privod.ru/userfiles/file/83935373908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=product+key+for+windows+8.1+2021PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dece.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDECE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6E0 18024 bytes
SHA-256: 9e8666f489d9cb2a3056c205f98603e6c23c2a7b86547792853abfb19c5069f1
font_02_sfnt_off00012558.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12558 11224 bytes
SHA-256: 1b25309f8bdb119fa1e730ae1c7f00618a4a716e443cd70de472ec54ce60d171

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