Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c26c99eeb30da221…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

306.5 KB Created: 2022-08-05 07:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-05
MD5: 578f0e48afff4fa6927f146b2c6c1cf3 SHA-1: 112b4c96c4f74e5ef7c89110e59a499068cfcad9 SHA-256: c26c99eeb30da221f74dd0951f4b8de0207e5801b64cd8d2a1abf1f906668096
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically mentioning a JAR extension. This suggests the document is a dropper for a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
7c9dfbac9374dbd2bc52c0b3e62d742dbdba7fd95aece641d6b99868d7f65b8b
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 178176 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
4de498546c982d8e12b0c199c81fd4e941dd02cbdcb60de5d66e1f6c30e8022a
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 173953 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
d27633b2062c1a71ee964128b173e36379a8908acb2ad5c8fce91273d549e6e2
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes