Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c25ce96f5b19bc72…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.6 KB Created: 2021-08-11 09:09:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 9dc3abe1cf2933d19c83010489641ccf SHA-1: a54c1be6e4ea3f9c2f8ae95bfb66824eddcacbb6 SHA-256: c25ce96f5b19bc72a706511e6d942f383415dab17c3f8551e93512954b39f6b0
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including ML classification, a lure to execute commands via clipboard copy/paste (consistent with ClickFix attacks), and numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites. The embedded URLs and the document's structure suggest it's designed to trick users into downloading and executing further malicious content, likely a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=where+do+i+put+amtlib+dll+file+in+adobe PDF link annotation
    • https://murtenhof.ch/userfiles/files/kukurogirij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://noxsun.com/jingkelun/userfiles/files/20210810024804.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://championsforchildren.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/12ba9f626457b74dd27b1e79fca0071e/ketemumete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.pharmaright.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0l83jam3ja6co8in8rehq33fam/69927346332.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.training4thefuture.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606deb761837b---73020096956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nyett.hk/uploads/news/files/gibamovafepab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://espaciocultivarte.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/toxov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maydongy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/789g86pg90hq0j38ga9m67oqg5/rinunita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sevimticaret.net/userfiles/file/tukis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://prolocolidodisavio.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/73490189259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dymenahealthcare.com//upload/fckeditor/file/vagonateduxepazinovap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ag-concept.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2e17136c496a9deec08a06b76c9cc887/mixagesuxenaxuvib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pilotcenter.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tuupjgufsugjknmmleom8ffd5b/zedada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://iveducentar.com/uploads/assets/file/91074918129.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ontime-taxi.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/79af45048a9f8b06e6e640130c7d46d2/20349413771.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.certificagreen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aaaf1c2683e---50386313531.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ddriu.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7e3bb0c5d5875c2fdf42f5858cd89197/didarafenakovedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ackerviewguesthouse.com/userfiles/file/wozirujabiworijexegexuzu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kiakaha.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8qjsi4tq68f95kctcmfrgfm9ib/15315681740.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c59c52948f6---63490972179.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://bularz-auto.pl/images/userfiles/file/9159093243.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allycatering.com/userfiles/towulefubad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df8f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF8F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7a1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7A1 16944 bytes
SHA-256: 611c5f7b50aac81c2bcc4435fc41a6ea5c74730f3c5fcca8ef0c61cd4df61788
font_02_sfnt_off000123bc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x123BC 10828 bytes
SHA-256: 015a35a2ee8a5549a6514e39ad0c18c9871bc436a3734393cc6de4e20e2c7969

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