Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c25c97fee3ba2475…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.3 KB
MD5: d2c8dbbc092dc700b258cbdbfba44089 SHA-1: 6317594db47bcfbc1c722b10474d32750c7eb23e SHA-256: c25c97fee3ba247571b1eb3f6779d0c36f5cdd17acff05d914a0da80cc585996
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through the Equation Editor. This exploit is known to be used for delivering second-stage malware. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests an attempt to activate the embedded object, likely leading to remote code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000716.bin
724cce8baa4c3c48f1d4d173b8a09c939aa12f3b34f4d0a128664f376696c9b8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x716 1831 bytes