Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c254f8831d852292…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

64.5 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 0bd6d562186cf89edbd1b85b8724d563 SHA-1: 4709c156419bd5f953595519ef09cb59324fff86 SHA-256: c254f8831d8522929e3e55a69c671c6392269eb1bd5f5c6f28071cba4bd6fd6a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2009-3129 indicates that this Excel file is designed to exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability. The presence of references to VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs strongly suggests that the exploit is used to load and execute arbitrary code, likely a second-stage payload. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also indicative of a packed or obfuscated payload. The file is therefore classified as malicious, likely a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2009-3129 — Excel FEATHEADER record overflow critical CVE exact CVE_2009_3129
    Workbook BIFF stream contains a FEATHEADER (Feature Header) record with anomalous size (record_size=22, isf=4, cbHdrData=4). Legitimate FEATHEADER records are tiny (<100 bytes) and carry cbHdrData values that fit in the record body; the value here is the documented CVE-2009-3129 exploit primitive — cbHdrData drives a memcpy with attacker-controlled size, leading to memory corruption and code execution in Excel 2007/2003.
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 66,048 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 41,483 bytes (63%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API