Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c24d7ca6493677f6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.0 KB
MD5: 6c28e31d32e97db724188025636ac25e SHA-1: c5818d1883785293dfab00d2c1389b82cc74ad60 SHA-256: c24d7ca6493677f640cf6d4a90c746f949749f46e45873d77a71b94ab707a21f
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). Heuristics indicate the presence of OLE object data, automatic linking, and an update trigger, all pointing to exploitation. The embedded OLE object likely contains code to download and execute a secondary payload, although the specific download URL or payload is not directly extractable from the provided RTF structure.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001077.bin
20811b658206b44eebc606b34f5ca5978947d3bfa6a64bdc612f395658100ec3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1077 1762 bytes