Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c24ce589f64a8e2e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: 87c1dd2dec11c6b67bae5c8b52f94a10 SHA-1: afc8c4d3f54e890da4358a79abf55d6ee216966e SHA-256: c24ce589f64a8e2e26937b292a8cd3051062dcb312b9382cbde6380fdb937304
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated upon opening, leading to exploitation. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities to achieve code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bb.bin
b05ba9806d92dbc57281deb56b8e7c80ec11f5cf3746312796a9f6d65c61c025
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB 1591 bytes