Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c22625aee33717e8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.9 KB
MD5: 90d7a8e9150332f7b00a9020d4e42295 SHA-1: 78d0ee08cfa5063fe4650ac686be2830fdeae4f3 SHA-256: c22625aee33717e85ec2ad4ef2762275e18c88b3fd192e02fc28a069f868c79d
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. Specifically, the presence of OLE object data, automatic linking, and an object update command strongly suggest the execution of embedded malicious code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting known vulnerabilities to download and execute further stages.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000060.bin
55462da12f8bd963d204b7855e67da8138ed067ac21cacd41ff76bb9b67df356
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x60 1390 bytes