Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1f2914c473abdad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.6 KB Created: 2020-04-04 06:05:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: fc8053dcede67b26da578620b38f51d4 SHA-1: 286a536879a1d95f07d9909e2ff7059a71031c97 SHA-256: c1f2914c473abdadbe66aced34bc9c8b17fda1f51a7309c2d502b541e7654183
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, suggesting a link farm or redirection to malicious sites. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body mentions 'Dying light campaign length', which, combined with the numerous external links, points towards a lure for further malicious activity.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ecfya.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483550/130483550.html#dying+light+campaign+length
    • http://theseniorexecutive.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639337/20d572cc1fc0b7.pdf
    • http://commishkit.printemall.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398046/lotalesawapox_paguwot.pdf
    • http://applausehotel.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604612/600898.pdf
    • http://hewmatt.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130272496/83956.pdf
    • http://smartpromoting.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620679/xusekeserojo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006437.bin
ab562e7b0821c0d6c6411e5eeec6637be4e29a93ee1bbe44660b552ac746a128		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6437 8372 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000845c.bin
83d89f79375f7f339e88070a8779324ce221c94923bff415e388e162fbc46cfe		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x845C 2604 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.