Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1ee424395f24c59…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 38506a04b49f0cff4c80a831cae53476 SHA-1: 25fbe911cdcfef20620be4afd0fd6c112cf82d00 SHA-256: c1ee424395f24c593ebbca573e90e9e8a4b900d953047835027c55442e0f8aae
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated upon opening, leading to exploitation. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, often used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000dc.bin
ef11b78211b2aa980c233a36c0e668abac2aa5f97247c1254fbf72cc06c3a772
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDC 1745 bytes