Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1eacea674656dc6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

404.0 KB
MD5: 9998b2426c516559c118a0e9195fa034 SHA-1: c7c48f39ddece5314675b29c6cba93095fba6339 SHA-256: c1eacea674656dc6ae3e135a63e4a2cbb1c448012e2a52d90cfffff1e6f110e0
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1137.003 DLL Search Order Hijacking

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an embedded OLE object, indicating it is likely an exploit carrier. The default encryption suggests a common, potentially automated, delivery method. While no specific script or macro content was directly analyzed, the presence of an embedded exploit carrier strongly suggests the intent to execute malicious code upon opening.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.