RTF malware analysis — malicious · c1d98c309b791c01

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.13 MB Created: 2024-04-03 08:46:00 First seen: 2025-07-21

MD5: 837365f5e11d7f0c2bab53592fdafd83 SHA-1: 6e45171e5dca1e57b4fcb16de0b96a03f0e15ed6 SHA-256: c1d98c309b791c0193ae566a83b945fe3abe3be0adeebfb1753bbaee391dac62

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model and Distributed Component Object Model

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882 heuristics strongly indicates this exploit. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests an attempt to trigger the OLE object's execution, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 6

CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882

Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00003a12.bin` `5c63e7cea9ae45286ad25a3fdd1ce3118b693a0c9bbf190f4641a0d892686fab`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12	31019 bytes
`objdata_01_off0001dcbb.bin` `9e8b68393d57d3e633893d134c107c3da58d6e56a7e72494dca54b9ee885b5f4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCBB	584266 bytes

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