Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1d3a3cd4ffecf4a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: ec1dd21c6107a5efb7e53ca57f46b87c SHA-1: 6606e2c703e32455d2f56048accf33d97e825486 SHA-256: c1d3a3cd4ffecf4ac5de27b9ccf9424fb60d9ee883f41e0f2dc6cdb8fca130d3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code. No scripts or URLs were extracted, but the heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of CVE-2017-11882.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d1.bin
e5a9ad0b4ea6e4c977bea1177cd9c2410d7752942502794a9927329e4cc4412c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1 1841 bytes