Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1d25b575454a175…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.4 KB Created: 2020-08-08 05:53:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 45b73de74c5d9d8594aa8c9ab46d8f91 SHA-1: e87d76f8df3bf9aa8b0b6ac70a9a529e094f83a9 SHA-256: c1d25b575454a175877d7b1803b4d55a9310e2eacf5a884c4c9404d2f64c95c1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a link farm designed to appear as legitimate PDF documents, but one of the primary links redirects to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to IELTS preparation and the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to a phishing or malware distribution site. The presence of multiple external links, many hosted on Shopify, indicates a link farm strategy to obscure the final malicious destination.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=s%25C3%25A1ch+ielts+ng%25E1%25BB%258Dc+b%25C3%25A1ch+2020+pdf
    • http://files.villageofpound.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384127/6999905.pdf
    • http://files.christchurchaylmer.ca/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406811/8673870.pdf
    • http://files.deannaheathrealty.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739232/lejororetupom.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4879/6309/files/garepon.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8800/2710/files/35701091912.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2417/0664/files/26560510620.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5795/4467/files/mosexakevuveditefu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8068/6491/files/quimica_peter_atkins.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7341/3032/files/jajino.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9963/4328/files/70178310109.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0443/8127/4278/files/kalispell_police_blotter.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4979/4213/files/33847268867.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/6431/0425/files/reason_and_responsibility_14th_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4914/0902/files/10179776128.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9958/4664/files/63976230546.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1755/2543/files/fazonoxolowaz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4444/6118/files/36409078274.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006731.bin
b27dea1dab31fa37afebf05cfb4de785aa2840cb0b66872b2c913861a32cd582		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6731 5988 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007b54.bin
fd54bf2abe5d8cdaf4be5aa2822b8690f438c67088ed8d0279ab91e27c4a81f5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B54 10544 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.