Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1ccb200cdf12b8c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.28 MB
MD5: bbca381bb972ce05603c310185007436 SHA-1: 4d33939ad1a1fea1a496e24935ba393d3eb5d932 SHA-256: c1ccb200cdf12b8cf78e6096176f514107c545e94b437e9223d21e09d866b7c7
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an encrypted Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and likely carries a malicious payload, specifically exploiting CVE-2018-0798. The encryption and the nature of the embedded object suggest a delivery mechanism for a secondary exploit or payload, likely initiated by user interaction.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.