Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1c714b7be1f4724…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

841.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 14245e3e9d43b3f00399af7e38f09fcd SHA-1: 9e2a0e024a692817bb12d3537cfbfea82587d5f4 SHA-256: c1c714b7be1f4724ce039c2ae4925e435fd882b23c7cfe97de1c20ced7540290
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided heuristics.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000c6a96.bin
c3fc5ae1a656e725e93c205dcddc2fb20f257f79cc271b5eea84ce7606f160ae
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC6A96 3669 bytes