Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1bacb009b897f61…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.5 KB Created: 2020-12-25 00:15:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d13a361e63a38542f2dee614ef76fcf3 SHA-1: 12589143d2d776b592e33fe0ff4124969ef9d03c SHA-256: c1bacb009b897f614443945051d79847dedcde4fc0c681fefc63d3fc5f860520
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, and presents a lure related to an 'Adobe flash player application initialization error'. This strongly suggests a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates a large number of outbound links, likely to various malicious sites. ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' further supports the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/123?utm_term=adobe+flash+player+application+initialization+error
    • https://topalezomezo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305389/85560e5.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lewivapawo/hhhjPGJ/lojodosasizapiwosane.pdf
    • https://nozudasukexip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134441991/2166752.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375357/normal_5f89ad4ee9b58.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379733/normal_5f8af41f5cfb0.pdf
    • https://medimigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134864966/3128267.pdf
    • https://mubojage.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134377346/jabujosiminenowusu.pdf
    • https://bopugokux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134901566/wexupatufumenix.pdf
    • https://wuvirinofibugiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070402/tokuvapowifov.pdf
    • https://sasozepawises.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315695/2741310.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9ef.bin
5b02cf80a63e1da6621a252247d79ec3bc86fe1bdd94b0123107c54eb86f8dbd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9EF 5524 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ecc0.bin
0de4a3e67316127c672089a5bce5b621c1e896947b1616d4e6701abf042f2080		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECC0 10632 bytes

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