Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1b80a84bbac8945…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.7 KB Created: 2020-09-30 09:28:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 680b603d25d49618a7ec74a1870c63b0 SHA-1: 33176ef7d043e1a6427dea57e451c216ad852f0c SHA-256: c1b80a84bbac8945e730b644648a1b6b837d896a966f82edffd7fa40127fe52d
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, includes the target URL and appears to be designed to mimic educational content for SEO poisoning. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the conclusion that this is a link farm used for malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=equivalent+expressions+worksheet+6th+grade+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036655.mozfiles.com/files/1036655/35863864056.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037205.mozfiles.com/files/1037205/rosuxogozepavuvibelasu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037253.mozfiles.com/files/1037253/lenow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037010.mozfiles.com/files/1037010/28457396832.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.projectcaleb.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606965/nuletixabas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.converge214.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969341/gisinufe-fimekininawimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.margaretgriffithsilverjewellery.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437812/xuwegodowifavox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.level2rak.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455832/jalinunosawanab-rekufere-fevigomoset-vepewovenesuwop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b152539e-4da8-4faa-855c-a03b65f1399e/77965545340.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c6084864-a746-4efd-866f-c0411c60d656/gowejoziwajuxan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4e851e08-dd6f-4755-9eb4-43cf2c4155cd/88488179553.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/634b553c-49ea-4834-9a54-dd8db205fae0/fiwax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6d951d8e-0e99-4cd9-b76d-ab118529d9f5/49267238202.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4eab5b6c-2e5e-4123-9c2f-5dff19a1cd1a/98449519644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000068f1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68F1 5708 bytes
SHA-256: 63130dd4a21db4aa981781ff0de5b4e33a27423bc5949c096bd2b3a835684fd0
font_01_sfnt_off00007c73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C73 10344 bytes
SHA-256: 35747202d6b92a294eb82114c7005e966351c457afe31615f04fdd1951130597
font_02_sfnt_off00009fcf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9FCF 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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