Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1a45b4ebb744553…

MALICIOUS

PDF

121.6 KB Created: 2021-06-30 00:02:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: 6ad1e408b78e940b43a008f74c3ba650 SHA-1: 7ddd6e75377b2ac32702a1db42204975e4f02503 SHA-256: c1a45b4ebb744553be20b6d4c71715a2d45a1aa9d4765e7eb0135954cb534a9c
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to various domains, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS upload storage or appear to be disposable. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery through these links. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports a lure-based attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9965

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://clap-bas.com/userfiles/file/59264220437.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://nuyewpilot.academy/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9830df73c77c270867e457580ec9fb8c/30893850303.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.popcaffe.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/28dada3e1f9bf2496ef2d2f62d2798d5/kokezufetopanesegobe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hospedeagora.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vfgivvmugqoijs9vtgokgggb2r/wodulegixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kameleonhastanc.hu/files/file/6244722489.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ttccid.com/userfiles/files/dovonorujuxanibufodegobu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artospace.com/pics/file/poferapudemanesenetovevu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yourlightingbrand.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/956dca6aaa3011bd606887348496a2de/lamogijidifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hacunamatata.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a10705072453966c76f7dfb20a458743/908508768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tcufroghouses.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b7665cefb0---18286866569.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ogblfrontaliers.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lfq4ear53re0svp5jibucnq14l/94506287366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokorny-podlahy.cz/UserFiles/File/23262501702.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://surrattsville69.com/clients/8/81/8122276c22396d7fa0996010cc369f50/File/14845800705.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polyalpan.hu/_user/file/siwisujujakamebuwiribolub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gaviprintpack.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609938b891fcf---19403408442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://krindustria.com.br/site/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071a1d325a55---83546620394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://desertflying.club/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d74b3b8435---kojabafirerijuluw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bsbcarpet.com/userfiles/file/4879853601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://computerzone.pk/file/48011931235.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.guaitoli.eng.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f44d16c4db---23021405131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lion-trading.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ti6p52vglv4gpv92appnbofj57/32463563775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://canadianrelocation.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160764d1626840---jujuwadupatitun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noukos.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072846663ff8---83049244937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=baker+mayfield+nfl+contractPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000175a6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x175A6 10728 bytes
SHA-256: cc11aca36ff31363367ddc43bbea20f0ab678752539155eb196a53922907a45a
font_01_sfnt_off00018e4b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18E4B 18992 bytes
SHA-256: 5ad9b193a7dba200195d11c06c5d9aff3b7a602c34a06782b2276d4fe36fe78d
font_02_sfnt_off0001c072.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1C072 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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